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Wednesday, November 27, 2019

Could Gambling Save Science Encouraging An Honest Consensus Essays

Could Gambling Save Science: Encouraging an Honest Consensus To appear in Social Epistemology, 1992. (version appeared: in Proc. Eighth Intl. Conf. on Risk and Gambling, London, 7/90.) C O U L D G A M B L I N G S A V E S C I E N C E? Encouraging an Honest Consensus by Robin Hanson Visiting Researcher, The Foresight Institute P.O. Box 61058, Palo Alto, CA 94306 USA [emailprotected] 510-651-7483 The pace of scientific progress may be hindered by the tendency of our academic institutions to reward being popular, rather than being right. A market-based alternative, where scientists can more formally "stake their reputation", is presented here. It offers clear incentives to be careful and honest while contributing to a visible, self-consistent consensus on controversial (or routine) scientific questions. In addition, it allows patrons to choose questions to be researched without choosing people or methods. The bulk of this paper is spent examining potential problems with the proposed approach. After this examination, the idea still seems plausible and worth further study. INTRODUCTION After reviewing the discrepancy between what we want from academic institutions and what we get from current institutions, a market-based alternative called "idea futures" is suggested. It is described through both a set of specific scenarios and a set of detailed procedures. Over thirty possible problems and objections are examined in detail. Finally, a development strategy is outlined and the possible advantages are summarized. THE PROBLEM THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION Four centuries ago, some Europeans complained that the existing academic institutions were biased against them. Insiders, it was said, were "inflated by letters" and shunned anyone who dared "speculate on anything out of the common way" [De]. Outsiders -- astrologers, chemists, and people like Bacon and Galileo -- argued that they and their theories should be judged by how well they agreed with observations, and not by how they agreed with the authorities of the day [Gal]. This was the age of utopias [Whi], as these rebels debated possible academic reforms and imagined whole new social institutions, for both academia in particular and society in general. Within a century or so, the intellectual descendants of these outsiders became the new insiders in a process now called the "Scientific Revolution". They introduced a new respect for observations along with new social institutions, such as the Royal Society of London, inspired by those utopian ideals. Since then science has made impressive progress. Most controversial issues of four centuries ago seem long settled by now, and continued research may well settle most of today's controversies. Academia can claim some credit for this, and academic institutions have continued to evolve in response to perceived problems, formalizing publication in journals, credit in citations, and evaluation in anonymous peer review. PROBLEMS WITH ACADEMIA Yet little has really changed. Academia is still largely a medieval guild, with a few powerful elites, many slave-like apprentices, and members who hold a monopoly on the research patronage of princes and the teaching of their sons. Outsiders still complain about bias, saying their evidence is ignored, and many observers [Gh,Red,SmP,Syk,Tr,Tul] have noted some long-standing problems with the research component of academia. {footnote: Teaching reform is beyond the scope of this paper. I am content to observe that there are no obvious reasons why the changes I will propose should make teaching worse.} As currently practiced {footnote: Early peer reviewer consisted more of personally observing experiments and trying to reproduce analyses.} peer review is just another popularity contest, inducing familiar political games; savvy players criticize outsiders, praise insiders, follow the fashions insiders indicate, and avoid subjects between or outside the familiar subjects. It can take surprisingly long for outright lying by insiders to be exposed [Red]. There are too few incentives to correct for cognitive [Kah] and social [My] biases, such as wishful thinking, overconfidence, anchoring [He], and preferring people with a background similar to your own. Publication quantity is often the major measure of success, encouraging redundant publication of "smallest publishable units" by many co-authors. The need to have one's research appear original gives too little incentive to see if it has already been done elsewhere, as is often the case, and neglects efforts to integrate previous research. A preoccupation with "genius" and ideological wars over "true" scientific method [Gh] needlessly detract from just trying to be useful. Perhaps the core problem is that academics are rewarded mainly for telling a good story, rather than for being right. (By "right" I include not only being literally correct, but also being on the right track, or enabling work on the right track.)

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